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The old Wild West attitude, "shoot first and ask questions
later," is alive and well in United States law enforcement today. It
is especially apparent in the "war" against international drug
trafficking and money laundering. When coupled with the use of
new and powerful law enforcement weapons, the swaggering
attitude exhibited by law enforcement can cause great danger to
friend and foe alike.
In the spirit of strong law enforcement, the United States has
the power to indict a foreign financial institution and to seize its
assets worldwide. This power is one which may destroy a financial
institution. This can have devastating impact, not only on the
institution itself, but also on the financial sector of the home
country, particularly if the home country is small. This article will
review the extraordinary international power being utilized by the
United States to solve its drug problem.1
As with any war, the major combatants are driven by their
own interests and, as a result, a certain amount of "collateral
damage" or injury to non-combatants is expected. Such injury is
even inevitable as the adversaries fight each other. This article
* © 1996 Kirk W. Munroe.
* Member of the Florida Bar and the Law Society of Upper Canada. B.A.,
University of Florida; J.D., Boston University.
1. The focus of this article is on financial institutions. As such, the expansion
of the extraterritorial reach of the United States in other circumstances, such as
the invasion of Panama to obtain General Noriega for his drug trial in Miami, or
the kidnapping of a Mexican doctor, Dr. Alvarez-Machan, for the California trial
for the torture-murder of a U.S. drug agent in Mexico, is beyond the scope of this
article.
This article is an extension of an article written by the author, see Kirk W.
Munroe, Money Laundering: Problems for International Private Banking, 9 REV.
OF BANKING & FIN. SERVICES 9 (1993).
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addresses one dimension of the collateral damage issue: the
unintended harm caused by the United States when it utilizes the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of its criminal justice system against
foreign financial institutions of small nations.
II. The Business of International Banking in the Caribbean
2
International banking for many of the small nations of the
Caribbean is an important segment of their economic well-being.
Banking provides much needed revenue to small nations as well as
good jobs for its people. Banking is considered a clean, desirable
industry. However, to attract depositors and investors - the
lifeblood of any financial institution, banks in the small countries
must necessarily offer a more favorable banking environment. This
translates to minimum taxes and maximum confidentiality which,
in turn, leads to a higher risk of infiltration by criminally-derived
money that always seeks secrecy.
While the issues surrounding the so-called bank secrecy havens
are beyond the scope of this article, a few more words are
important to place the topic of this article in context. International
banking in the Caribbean attracts the affluent foreign bank
customer. While domestic retail banking is designed to handle a
larger volume of smaller transactions for the average domestic
person, international banking is designed to handle more significant
banking business for the wealthy individual in a very personalized
and confidential manner.'
The customer profile of an international banking client is a
wealthy nonresident individual.4 Often the individuals are from
2. The small nations of the Caribbean provide the clearest example of the
"friendly fire" thesis. The simple fact of geography places the Caribbean countries
in the middle between two much larger adversaries engaged in an extended "war,"
the drug war. On one side, to the north, is the United States, the most powerful
nation on earth today. On the other side, to the south, are the drug cartels,
perhaps the most powerful criminal organizations ever. In the middle are the
Caribbean countries.
Literally, the Caribbean countries are "caught in the middle" of this historic
struggle. Because this war is over the supply of drugs by the cartels to its huge
market, the people of the United States, the product flows from south to north and
the profits return from north to south. Whether it is drugs flowing north to their
ultimate market or the resulting monies flowing south to safety and to their
owners, geography makes the flow and, therefore, the resulting problems to the
small Caribbean nations, quite predictable.
3. See Nigel A. L. Brooks, Wooing the Wealthy, 67 BANK MGMT. 41-42
(1991).
4. George Barton, Private Banking - A Crucial Market, Int'l Banking
Monograph Series, Univ. of Miami Int'l Bus. & Banking Inst. 4-5 (July 1987). See
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lesser developed nations, frequently the countries of Latin America,
and they are seeking a safe haven for their capital. The services
provided always include confidentiality.5 This is especially valuable
for Latin Americans who continue to be plagued by political
instability and violence, including kidnappings for ransom in their
home countries. 6  Consequently, international bankers in the
Caribbean commonly assist their clientele in achieving their
confidentiality goals through such legal vehicles as corporations and
trusts.7  These vehicles are also utilized for other legitimate
reasons, most notably tax and estate planning.8 Avoidance of tax
liability and estate complications in a foreign country are certainly
understandable and lawful goals. To attain them, locations like tax
preferential jurisdictions are favored. 9
III. The U.S. Money Laundering Law
International banking in the Caribbean offers opportunities for
certain higher forms of money laundering. Generally this excludes
the cruder or "retail" form of money laundering, namely the
structuring of cash deposits to avoid the currency reporting laws,
commonly called "smurfing,"1 ° simply because international
banking is not a cash oriented business. Rather, international
banking lends itself to larger non-cash deposits and to more
Brooks, supra note 3, at 41, 42-44 (labeling the market segmentation as executive,
high net worth and multimillionaire/international).
5. Barton, supra note 4, at 5; Brooks, supra note 3, at 43-44. See also William
W. Park, Legal Policy Conflicts in International Banking, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067,
1093-94 (1989) (commenting on capital flight and the need for anonymity).
6. In the midst of unprecedented improvement of economic
conditions which took place [in Colombia], signs of deep social
malaise became ominously apparent: kidnapping for ransom
increased drastically, private para-military groups appeared, the
private security industry boomed, judges were frequently
assassinated, bankruptcies of large manufacturing and financial
firms became common, and the general level of violence in the
society increased.
Francisco E. Thoumi, Some Implications of the Growth of the Underground
Economy in Colombia, 29 J. INT'AM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 35, 36 (1987). See
also Bruce M. Bagley, Colombia and the War on Drugs, 67 FOREIGN AFF. 70, 71-
73 (1988) (interesting review of the post-World War II violent legacy of
Colombia).
7. See Barton, supra note 4, at 8-9.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 9.
10. See generally Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the
Federal Criminal Law: The Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41 U. FLA. L. REV.
287 (1989).
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sophisticated financial transactions." Accordingly, this article
reviews the U.S. money laundering law most applicable to the
international banking business.
Money laundering, the cleansing of money earned from an
illegal business to appear to be a product of a lawful business,12 is
not new. Most economically motivated criminals always have
wanted to appear legitimate. However, a new development is the
criminalization of money laundering. The process itself is now a
crime separate from the crime that produced the money.13
U.S. President Ronald Reagan signed the Money Laundering
Control Act in the fall of 1986.1' The Act was the first United
States specific law against the conduct of money laundering. 5
Moreover, in each successive election year: 1988, 1990, 1992, and
1994, the law has been expanded.
16
The law that has been created is broader than the common
usage of the phrase money laundering. When people think of
money laundering, people usually think of the legitimization of
money obtained from crime, a one time transformation of cash
money." The United States law is, however, much broader. It is
not limited to cash, but includes all monetary instruments and all
financial transactions."8 The dirty money, in theory, never loses
its taint, never is cleansed. In effect, the law criminalizes banking
services to criminals. Each movement of dirty money is a separate
crime.
The law was specifically designed to be broad. The term
"financial transaction" is defined to encompass virtually every-
11. For a review of common international private banking products, see
Barton, supra note 4, at 6-9.
12. Welling, supra note 10, at 290-1.
13. For an historical overview, see G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering:
The Crime of the 90's, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 149 (1989).
14. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-182 (1986) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957).
15. Strafer, supra note 13, at 149.
16. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181,
(1988); Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4791 (1990); Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money
Laundering Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044 (1992); Money Laundering
Suppression Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2253 (1994).
17. Munroe, supra note 1, at 11.
18. For the definitions of financial transaction, see 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3) &
(4). For the definition of monetary instruments, see 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(5).
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thing.19 In the banking context, it includes every deposit, with-
drawal, transfer, exchange, loan, delivery, purchase, or sale.2'
The enumerated crimes, the proceeds from which can form the
basis of a money laundering violation, also are broadly defined. It
is a popular misconception that only drug money can be laundered.
This is not true in the United States. In the U.S., virtually any
felony which generates money is included in the statute. Such
felonies include everything from misapplication of bank funds and
bank fraud to environmental crimes and violations of the Arms
Export Control Act.22 Indeed, the trend toward applying the
statute to every crime that generates money continues. In 1992,
Congress added more offenses, felonies in violation of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, as well as any fraud against a non-U.S.
bank.2
The knowledge element of the crime was also intended by
Congress to be broad.24 The Act does not require knowledge of
the precise type of crime which generated the proceeds. The Act
only requires knowledge that the proceeds involved in the financial
transaction are derived from some federal, state, or foreign
felony.'
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, this knowledge
requirement can be satisfied by proof of "willful blindness.
26
Under the willful blindness doctrine, proof of guilty knowledge may
be satisfied by proof that a person intentionally avoided learning
the truth and acted "with an awareness of the high probability of
the existence of the fact in question.,
27
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3) & (4).
20. It should be noted that it is unnecessary to prove that all the money in a
transaction is from specified unlawful activity. The law only requires that the
transaction "involve" dirty money. In other words, tainted money commingled
with legitimate money satisfies the statute. United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832,
836-40 (7th Cir. 1991).
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).
22. Id.
23. Annunzio-Wylie, supra note 16, at §§ 1534, 1536, 106 Stat. at 4066 & 4067
(to be codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§1956(c)(7)(D) and (B)).
24. S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12 (1986).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1).
26. S. REP. No. 433, supra note 24, at 10 (quoting United States v. Jewell, 532
F.2d 697, 699-700 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951, 96 S. Ct. 3173, 49 L. Ed.2d
1188 (1976)).
27. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700. Also called "deliberate ignorance," one
standardized jury instruction for willful blindness reads, in pertinent part, as
follows:
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Thus, one who is willfully blind is assumed to have full
knowledge. "It's none of my business," is not a defense in the U.S.
to ignorance that the funds involved were the proceeds of illegal
activity.2" In sum, under the United States law, it is a money
laundering violation to participate in any routine private banking
transaction which involves dirty money, even if the transaction
includes the most time honored vehicle for respecting the client's
confidentiality. As long as the participant knows the money is
dirty, or is willfully blind to the criminal source of the money, there
is a money laundering violation.
IV. Enforcing the U.S. Law against Foreign Banks
The U.S. has put a number of common U.S. legal principles to
work in its war against money laundering. These include the U.S.
legal concept of corporate criminal liability, as well as the execution
of new forfeiture laws and the expansion of transnational or
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
A. Corporate Criminal Liability and Collective Knowledge
Under U.S. law, a corporation may be criminally liable for the
acts and omissions of its agents and employees who are acting
within the scope of their authority so long as the acts are intended
to benefit the corporation, at least in part.29 This rule can be
summarized as follows:
A corporation may be convicted for the criminal acts of its
agents, under a theory of respondeat superior. But criminal
liability may be imposed on the corporation only where the
The government may prove that the Defendant acted
"knowingly" by proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this defendant
deliberately closed [his][her] eyes to what would otherwise have been
obvious to [him][her]. No one can avoid responsibility for a crime by
deliberately ignoring what is obvious. A finding beyond reasonable
doubt of an intent of the defendant to avoid knowledge or enlightenment
would permit the jury to infer knowledge. Stated another way, a
defendant's knowledge of a particular fact may be inferred from a
deliberate or intentional ignorance or deliberate or intentional blindness
to the existence of that fact.
1 E. DEVITr ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS §17.09 (4th ed.
1992).
28. See United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1331 (1993); United States v. Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d 720 (7th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 331 (1992).
29. New York Central & Hudson R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 29
S. Ct. 304, 306-7, 53 L. Ed. 613 (1909).
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agent is acting within the scope of his employment. That, in
turn, requires that the agent be performing acts of the kind
which he is authorized to perform, and those acts must be
motivated - at least in part - by an intent to benefit the
corporation."°
This is not a difficult standard to satisfy under U.S. law. The
"scope of authority" concept is not deflected by company policy
forbidding all employees from violating any law.3' If this were so,
there would be no corporate criminal liability in the U.S. Rather,
the concept means that the conduct must be in connection with a
job-related function. For example, a corrupted bank officer who
assists a launderer in wiring transfers of illegal funds to a Caribbe-
an country would be deemed to be acting within the scope of his
authority, because assisting bank customers with their wire transfers
is one of the officer's jobs. Further, the "intent to benefit" also
poses little problem for U.S. prosecutors because virtually all
banking transactions benefit the bank to at least some degree.
Using the wire transfer example again, because the bank charged
its normal $25 fee for wiring the money to Switzerland, the bank
benefitted from the transaction.
The U.S. government can attribute an employee's willful acts
to the corporation.32 The U.S. government can prove corporate
willfulness by showing that the corporation had either intentionally
disregarded the law or had acted with plain indifference to its
requirements. The instructions given by the judge to the jury in the
Bank of New England33 case is informative on this issue:
Alternatively, the bank as an institution has certain
responsibilities; as an organization, it has certain responsibilities.
And you will have to determine whether the bank as an
organization consciously avoided learning about and observing
[the cash reporting] requirements. The Government to prove
the bank guilty on this theory, has to show that its failure to file
was the result of some flagrant organizational indifference. In
this connection, you should look at the evidence as to the
30. United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-2 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
sub nom., Zero v. United States, 459 U.S. 991, 103 S. Ct. 347, 74 L. Ed.2d 387
(1982).
31. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004-7 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom., United States v. Western International Hotels Co., 409 U.S. 1125,
93 S. Ct. 938, 35 L. Ed.2d 256 (1973).
32. See United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 855-57
(1st. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943, 108 S. Ct. 328 (1987).
33. Id.
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bank's efforts, if any, to inform its employees of the law; its
effort to check on their compliance in response to various bits
of information that it got in August and September of '84 and
February of '85; its policies, and how it carried out its stated
policies.'
Moreover, under a related U.S. legal theory, a corporation is
deemed to have the collective knowledge of all of its employees.
35
Because guilty knowledge is a crucial element of any U.S. money
laundering crime and because such knowledge, in this context, is
often derived from knowledge of the various circumstances
surrounding a particular transaction, it is possible for a corporation
to be held criminally responsible in the U.S. even though no single
employee is guilty. Even though no single employee knew all the
facts, the corporation, under the collective knowledge theory, is
deemed to know everything known by all of its employees. 36 This
is precisely what happened in the Bank of New England case: the
employees were set free and the bank was convicted.3 7 The court,
in that important case, instructed the jury as follows:
In addition, however, you have to look at the bank as an
institution. As such, its knowledge is the sum of the knowledge
of all the employees. That is, the bank's knowledge is the
totality of what all of the employees know within the scope of
their employment.... So, if you find that an employee within
the scope of his employment knew that [the currency transac-
tion reports] had to be filed, even if multiple checks are used,
the bank is deemed to know it. The bank is also deemed to
know it if each of several employees knew a part of that
requirement and the sum of what the separate employees knew
amounted to knowledge that such a requirement existed.38
Apparently, the assessment of criminal responsibility on
corporations by the United States is exceedingly broad. Indeed,
the U.S. is believed to have the broadest corporate criminal liability
laws in the world.
34. Id. at 855.
35. Id. at 856.
36. Id.
37. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 847-48.
38. Id. at 855.
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B. Forfeiture
Forfeitures have assumed an increasingly significant role in
U.S. law enforcement. This reflects a belated recognition of the
pecuniary motives of most crimes and an effort to strip away the
profits from crime.
Section 981 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides for civil
forfeiture of assets involved in violations of the currency reporting
requirements and structuring sections of the Bank Secrecy Act, as
well as of assets involved in violations of the Money Laundering
Control Act.39 Section 982 provides for criminal forfeiture of the
same assets for the same money laundering violations.4 Forfei-
tures can be generally defined as the divestiture without compensa-
tion of property used in a manner contrary to the laws of the sover-
eign.
41
Forfeitures have a long history in Anglo-American law. In
England, the value of an object which caused the death of a King's
subject was forfeited to the Crown.42 Forfeiture also resulted at
English common law from conviction of a felony.43 The land of
a convicted felon was forfeited to his lord and his chattels were
forfeited to the Crown." In fact, the term "felony" was defined
under English law as "'an offence which occasions a total forfeiture
of either lands or goods or both."'45
These harsh penalties of English common law found little favor
in the North American colonies. The first U.S. Congress abolished
such common law criminal forfeitures in 1790 byenacting a law
which states: "No conviction or judgment shall work. . . forfeiture
of estate. ' The U.S. Constitution also proscribes forfeiture of
estate for treason.47
39. 18 U.S.C. § 981 (a)(1)(A).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 982 (a)(1).
41. See United States v. Eight (8) Rhodesian Stone Statutes, 449 F. Supp. 193,
195 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
42. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 633, 681-82 (1974).
For a review of English forfeiture at the time of the ratification of the Bill of
Rights, see Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806-2808 (1993).
43. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
44. Id.
45. United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 (4th Cir.) (quoting 1 J.
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 382-83 (1856 ed.)), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 830 (1980).
46. 1 Stat. 112, 117, presently codified as 18 U.S.C. §3563.
47. U.S. CONST. art. III, §3, cl. 2.
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For almost 180 years, the United States did not enact criminal
forfeiture laws. 8 Then, in 1970, Congress enacted the RICO
statute,49 as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE or drug kingpin)
statute50 as part of The Controlled Substances Act. Each con-
tained the first new criminal forfeiture provisions enacted since the
birth of the U.S. republic. This does not mean to suggest, however,
that forfeiture was not practiced in the United States. Forfeiture
was practiced, and quite actively, but it was largely accomplished
in civil proceedings.
Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding which is brought
against the tainted property and resolves rights in the property as
against the whole world. 1 There is a long tradition for the civil
forfeiture of commodities, vessels, and other property used in
violation of U.S. customs, revenue, or criminal laws.
52
Criminal forfeiture, on the other hand, is an in personam
action which is brought against the individual who owns the
property to be seized." It is part of the criminal case and it is
only after a guilty verdict on the charge which is the predicate for
the forfeiture, that a criminal forfeiture may be rendered. 4
In general, the U.S. government can civilly forfeit an asset
upon a showing of "probable cause" that violations of certain laws
involve the asset.5 5  Black's Law Dictionary defines probable
cause as follows:
An apparent state of facts found to exist upon reasonable
inquiry, (that is, such inquiry as the given case renders conve-
nient and proper), which would induce a reasonably intelligent
and prudent man to believe, in a criminal case, that the accused
person had committed the crime charged, or, in a civil case, that
a cause of action existed.
56
48. Congress was confused when, in enacting the RICO law in 1970, it
believed that this was the first time Congress had provided for criminal forfeiture.
To the contrary, these statutes had long existed but were rarely used. See DAVID
B. SMITH, 1 PROSECUTION & DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES § 2.03, at 2-11
(1995).
49. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
50. 21 U.S.C. § 848.
51. SMrrH, supra note 48, § 2.03, at 2-9.
52. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684.
53. SMITH, supra note 48, § 2.03, at 2-9.
54. Id.
55. See generally SMITH, supra note 48, § 2.05.
56. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1365 (4th ed. 1968).
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Thus, the U.S. government can commence forfeiture actions if
it can show, after having made "convenient and proper" inquiries,
that it believes the property was involved in a crime. It need not
prove this involvement beyond a reasonable doubt. It need not
even prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. It only need
show that it has probable cause.57 As this is a civil forfeiture
action, the U.S. government need not bring criminal charges, either
before or after the forfeiture.58 Thus, the U.S. government can
forfeit assets without ever; bringing a criminal charge against
anyone involved with the asset.
Once the U.S. government has shown probable cause, it is up
to anyone claiming a bona-fide interest in the property to prove
that the property was not involved in a crime and should not have
been seized. 9 The claimant must prove a negative. Herein lies
the power of civil forfeiture. The U.S. government having only
probable cause, can seize property. The claimant then has the
entire burden of proof to show that the U.S. government should
not take the property. If the claimant fails to prove his case, the
U.S. government takes the property.
Historically, banks have experienced the power of the U.S.
forfeiture laws in two contexts. The first is when the U.S. seizes
the assets of the bank's customer, usually either a bank account or
real property. In this context, the bank generally has no direct
involvement in the case; the matter is between the U.S. government
and the bank's customer. Sometimes, however, the bank has a
security interest in all, or a portion of, the seized bank account
because it was pledged as collateral for a loan, or the bank has a
mortgage interest in the seized real property. In these instances,
the bank must protect its interest quickly because of the very short
time limitations in the U.S. civil forfeiture laws.6° In essence, the
bank must prove that it is an innocent lienholder; that it was not
aware the customer's money had an illegal source. Today, this task
can be very time consuming and expensive, as reflected in the
recent four-year experience of Republic National Bank of Miami
in obtaining its mortgage interest from a home seized by the U.S.
57. SMITH, supra note 48, § 11.03[1], at 11-12 - 11-14.
58. Id. § 1.03, at 1-31.
59. This "innocent owner" defense is statutory only. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981
(a)(2). Recently, the Supreme Court held that there is no constitutional "innocent
owner" defense. Bennis v. Michigan, 1996 WL 88269 (Mar. 4, 1996).
60. A claim must be filed within 10 days after execution of process. Rule
C(6), Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims.
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government.61 The bank finally won, but it took years and a trip
to the United States Supreme Court to do so.62
Banks also confront the U.S. forfeiture laws when the U.S.
seizes correspondent accounts located in the U.S. These seizures
can occur in connection with a criminal case against the bank, as it
did in the 1989 Banco de Occidente case.63 Such seizures can also
occur in a strictly civil context as it did in the Banco Cafetero
(Panama) case' in 1986 and, more recently in the Marine Midland
Bank case.6' If, as is often the case, the claimed illegal funds
merely cleared through the bank's correspondent account and no
longer are deposited with the bank, the bank must fight for its own
money.
66
U.S. government seizures of correspondent accounts was
recently in the forefront of law enforcement in New York City.
These recent seizures resulted from the tracing of U.S. Postal
money orders originally sold in the U.S. in connection with
smurfing operations.67 Because, under U.S. law, the illegal money
never becomes clean, when these money orders are returned to the
U.S. for collection via a correspondent account, they are at risk of
seizure. Moreover, recently, New York prosecutors seized not only
the value of the known illegal instruments, but also the balance of
the correspondent account under the theory that the account
"facilitated," or made easier, the money laundering transaction.
68
For example, in the Marine Midland Bank case, the prosecutors
froze over $7 million in the correspondent account of an affiliate,
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (Panama), even though they only
had evidence of approximately $1.5 million in tainted instru-
ments. 69 In another, more outrageous case, New York prosecutors
61. United States v. One Single Family Residence, 731 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla.
1990), appeal dismissed, 932 F.2d 1433 (lth Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nom., Republic
National Bank of Miami v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554, 121 L.Ed.2d 474 (1992),
forfeiture rev'd, 995 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1993).
62. Id.
63. United States v. Banco de Occidente, S.A., Cr. No. 89-086-A (N.D.Ga.).
64. United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1986).
65. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. United States, 11 F.3d 1119 (2d Cir. 1993).
66. Cf Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d at 1161 n.8 (noting that because the
Panama accounts were beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, the
government looked to the New York correspondent accounts of the bank).
67. See Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 11 F.3d at 1122.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1119.
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seized an entire correspondent account because seven $500 money
orders ($3,500) were cleared through the account.70
C. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
71
The U.S. money laundering law specifically provides for
extraterritorial jurisdiction when (a) the conduct is by a U.S. citizen
anywhere in the world or, if by a non-U.S. citizen, the conduct
occurs, at least in part, in the United States, and (b) the transac-
tion, or a series of related transactions, exceeds $10,000.72 Thus,
the United States asserts its own jurisdiction and will bring money
laundering criminal cases in the United States when at least part of
the transaction occurred in the United States. The following two
cases provide dramatic examples of the breadth of this self-
proclaimed extraterritorial jurisdiction.
V. Case Examples
A. Banco, de Occidente (Panama)
73
On March 29, 1989, a criminal indictment against a private
Colombian bank, Banco de Occidente, S.A., and its wholly owned
Panamanian subsidiary, Banco de Occidente (Panama), S.A., was
unsealed in Atlanta.74 The indictment accused both banks of two
conspiracy counts which alleged the laundering of the proceeds of
drug transactions. 75  The indictment also included a criminal
forfeiture charge.
7 6
A civil action was brought against both banks and another
subsidiary, Banco de Occidente International, Ltd. (Montserrat).77
70. United States v. All Funds on Deposit, Civil Action No. CV-93-3643
(E.D.N.Y.).
71. The U.S. Supreme Court continues to rule in favor of an expansive view
of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. courts. On June 15, 1992, the Court held
that a citizen of a foreign state, with which the U.S. has an extradition treaty, is
subject to the criminal jurisdiction of U.S. courts even though the foreign citizen
was abducted by the U.S. government from the foreign state to the U.S. United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). The international legal
community is contesting the merits of this decision.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(0.
73. The author and William L. Richey coordinated the world-wide defense of
Banco de Occidente, S.A. and its subsidiary, Banco de Occidente (Panama).
74. United States v. Banco de Occidente, S.A., Cr. No. 89-086-A (N.D. Ga.).
75. Criminal Indictment filed in United States v. Banco de Occidente, S.A.,
on Mar. 29, 1989.
76. Id. at 35-75.
77. United States v. $412,308,212.93, Civ. No. 1:89-CV-582-RLV (N.D. Ga.).
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This action sought forfeiture of the $412 million in gross receipts
allegedly laundered.78 It also sought civil penalties for the same
amount against the banks.79
Contemporaneously, the government sought and obtained, in
the criminal case, an ex parte restraining order freezing all assets,
namely bank accounts, of both banks in the United States.'
Approximately $20 million at several correspondent banks was
frozen immediately in the United States.81 This frozen money had
no link to illegal activity, was not the proceeds of drug trafficking,
and, thus, represented money frozen as a substitute for tainted
assets.82
Within one week, the United States successfully had prodded
three additional countries to freeze bank accounts containing even
more substitute assets.83 Money in excess of $20 million was
frozen in Deutsch Sudamerikanische Bank in Hamburg, West
Germany.' Some $13.5 million was frozen in Swiss Bank Corpo-
ration in Toronto, Canada." Almost $30 million was frozen in
Swiss Bank and Union Bank of Switzerland in Basel and Zurich,
Switzerland, respectively.86 In one week, therefore, the United
States had coordinated the freezing of approximately $80 million
worldwide, the vast majority of which were the funds of the
Panamanian subsidiary.
This seizure of such a dramatic percentage of the total assets
of Banco de Occidente (Panama) placed the subsidiary into
insolvency. It was forced to seek the assistance of the Panamanian
Banking Commission.87 Within ten days of the unsealing of the
78. Id. at 9.
79. Id. at 9-10.
80. Motion for Restraining Order and Seizure Warrant, Restraining Order,
and Seizure Warrant all filed in United States v. Banco de Occidente, S.A., on
Mar. 28, 1989.
81. Inventory filed in Banco de Occidente, S.A.
82. At the time of the indictment, the government was able to trace the
alleged narcotics money to various accounts at Banco de Occidente (Panama) in
Panama by way of wire transfers from U.S. banks. Because of the bank secrecy
laws of Panama, however, the government was unable to trace further.
83. Motion to vacate Seizure Order filed in United States v. Banco de
Occidente on May 30, 1989.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id. (the actual amount is not contained in the U.S. court file).
87. Transcript of Plea Hearing on Aug. 14, 1989, at 26, before the Honorable
William C. O'Kelley in United States v. Banco de Occidente, S.A.
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indictment, on April 7, 1989, the Panamanian Banking Commission
intervened and took control of Banco de Occidente (Panama)."8
After months of difficult and complicated negotiations which
involved the banks' various interests in eight nations, a resolution
was reached with the governments of the United States, Canada,
and Switzerland (the bank had managed to quickly unfreeze the
West German funds through the German courts).8 9 On August
14, 1989, Banco de Occidente (Panama) entered a guilty plea and
agreed to forfeit, over a period of four years, $5 million to the
United States.9' The United States, in turn, paid the Swiss and
the Canadians $1 million each from the initial $2 million forfeiture
payment.91 In exchange, the accounts worldwide were unfrozen,
the criminal case against the parent bank was dismissed, the civil
case was dismissed as to all parties, and both the Swiss and
Canadian cases were dropped.92 The Panamanian Banking
Commission also relinquished control of the subsidiary.93
Banco de Occidente, its ownership, and its top management,
are among the most respected of all Latin banks in international
banking and business circles.94 This fact ultimately saved the
bank, however, it did not keep the bank from being indicted, quite
simply because no one from the prosecution team had any
knowledge about the bank.95 It was assumed by the prosecutors
that the bank was dirty because it is a Colombian bank.
According to the U.S. government, the Panamanian subsidiary
was criminally liable through the acts of two corrupted bank
officials.96 These employees allegedly facilitated the movement of
money through the Panamanian subsidiary.97 The government
88. It is interesting to note that the government of Panama was then
controlled by General Manuel Noriega. This was an added problem due to the
significant and growing tensions between the governments of Panama and the
United States.
89. Written Plea of Guilty and Waiver Rights by Defendant Banco de





93. Personal knowledge and opinion of author (lawyer for bank).
94. Exhibit A, B, C, D, and E of Written Plea of Guilty and Waiver Rights
of Defendant Banco de Occidente (Panama), S.A., filed in United States v. Banco
de Occidente on Aug. 14, 1989.
95. Personal knowledge and opinion of author (lawyer for bank).
96. Transcript of Plea Hearing on Aug. 14, 1989, at 19-27.
97. Id.
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stated that the bank's employees had been bribed.98 The money
had come into the bank by wire transfers from established United
States banks, most of which are located in New York City.99
It was only after the indictment, and after entreaties from the
highest Colombian public officials to government departments
other than the Department of Justice, that the prosecutors
investigated and determined the bank's legitimacy." Without
question, this "discovery" was a major factor in the ultimate
positive resolution of the case.
The lessons learned from the Banco de Occidente case are
harsh, but clear. In a short span of time, the United States
coordinated a worldwide effort which caused the seizure of
approximately $80 million of liquid assets of the Panamanian
subsidiary. The gross assets'o of Banco de Occidente (Panama)
annually ranged from $125 to $160 million. The seizure of such a
large percentage of the bank's liquid assets immediately placed it
into insolvency, which quickly led to its takeover by the Panamani-
an Banking Commission. The monies seized were not the proceeds
of drug transactions. The government made no effort to suggest
otherwise. Rather, the government sought and obtained the ex
parte pretrial freeze order on a "substitute assets" theory."°2
B. Banque Leu (Luxembourg)
More than four years later, on December 13, 1993, a Luxem-
bourg bank, Banque Leu (Luxembourg), S.A., entered a plea of
guilty to money laundering in United States District Court in San
Francisco, California. °3 The bank agreed to forfeit $2.3 million
to the United States and more than $1 million to Luxembourg. °4
98. Id. at 27.
99. Government's Statement of the Facts for Purposes of Entry of Guilty Pleas
at 13 filed in United States v. Banco de Occidente, S.A. in Aug. 14, 1989.
100. Personal knowledge and opinion of author (lawyer for bank).
101. E.g., depositors' money.
102. It is interesting and important to note that since the 1989 Banco de
Occidente case, the majority of the U.S. federal appeals courts have disallowed
pretrial restraint of substitute assets. Cf. United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359
(9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1993); In re: Assets
of Martin, 1 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1993) with In re: Billman, 915 F.2d 916 (4th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 952, 111 S. Ct. 2258, 114 L.Ed.2d 711 (1991).
103. Information and Plea Agreement filed in United States v. Banque Leu
(Luxembourg), S.A., CR-93-0607 (N.D.Cal.), on Dec. 13, 1993 [hereinafter Plea
Agreement].
104. Plea Agreement, supra note 103, at 2-3.
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According to the court papers filed at the time of the plea
agreement, Banque Leu (Luxembourg) wanted to expand its
private banking deposit base.l"5 As part of its efforts to accom-
plish this objective, the bank hired an experienced account manager
fluent in Spanish who had South American contacts.1 °6 The new
manager's efforts led to the opening of various accounts by
Colombians."°  Two of these accounts were the basis of the
criminal charge."
The two accounts were related U.S. dollar accounts and were
opened in Luxembourg with cash.1" Thereafter, more than $2.3
million was deposited into the accounts over a one-year period.11 °
The deposits were in the form of cashiers checks, each under
$10,000, drawn on Los Angeles area banks, predominantly branches
of Bank of America." Bundles of these cashiers checks were
sent from the bank's customer in Colombia to Luxembourg for
deposit. The bank, in turn, sent these U.S. dollar cashiers
checks to its U.S. correspondent bank in New York City for
collection."' The U.S. correspondent bank then sent the cashiers
checks to Bank of America's check processing center, located in
Northern California, where they were finally paid.
114
In sum, a Luxembourg bank with no office in the United
States was charged and convicted of money laundering in the
United States on the basis of clearing U.S. dollar negotiable
instruments drawn on a U.S. bank, but deposited by non - U.S.
citizens in Luxembourg. In other words, acceptance of U.S. dollar
negotiable instruments by a bank anywhere in the world outside of
the United States renders the bank susceptible to U.S. criminal
jurisdiction in the money laundering area because all such instru-
ments must necessarily clear through the United States. This is, by
far, the most extreme example of the breadth of the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the United States in the money laundering field.
105. Stipulated Factual Basis for Guilty Plea 2 filed in United States v.
Banque Leu (Luxembourg), S.A., on Dec. 13, 1993 [hereinafter Guilty Plea].
106. Id. 3 & 4.
107. Id. 5.
108. Id. 116-8, 113-14.
109. Id. 10.
110. Guilty Plea, supra note 105, 10.
111. -Id. 1110, 16.
112. Id. 1110, 11.
113. Id. 11; Plea Agreement, supra note 103, 1 10-12.
114. Plea Agreement, supra note 103, 1110-12.
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The Banque Leu (Luxembourg) guilty plea is also noteworthy
because of its factual foundation. It is predicated upon the willful
blindness theory of knowledge."n The United States could prove
that the $2.3 million in cashiers checks were from drug sales
because it caught and convicted one of the Colombians controlling
the two bank accounts."6 The cashiers checks were, in fact, the
product of "smurfing" or structuring drug money cash deposits to
avoid the U.S. currency reporting laws.117 The cashiers checks
were sent down to Colombia and then to Luxembourg for deposit.
From the actual Colombian money launderer, however, it was
learned that the bank had no actual knowledge of the illegal source
of the money."' Neither the bank nor the account manager was
told of the true source.119 Further, no one at the bank was
bribed.12°
As a consequence, the knowledge element of the guilty plea is
founded upon the willful blindness of the account manager. Based
on the circumstances, both parties agreed that the account manager
should have known the illegal source of the deposits.121 The
stated factors upon which both parties agreed in the stipulated facts
filed with the court are the following:"22
- the deposits consisted of large numbers of cashier's checks,
bearer instruments that are the functional equivalent of cash;
- the checks were made out to a variety of individuals but not,
after the first batch of checks, to any account-holder or
signatory;
- the checks were uniformly under the amount of $10,000, the
threshold for reporting under U.S. law;
- the origin of the account-holders [was] Colombia ... [,] a
well-known center of the drug trade;
- there was no apparent connection between the form of the
deposits (i.e., numerous U.S. cashier's checks in small amounts)
and the nominal activities of the account-holders, who were
simply an individual Colombian investor and a Colombian
construction business;
115. Guilty Plea, supra note 105, 9115-16. For a discussion of "willful









- many of the checks were presented for deposit while bearing
dates more than six months prior to the deposit date;
- blocks of checks in relatively small denominations, made out
in similar amounts, purchased primarily from branches of Bank
of America in Los Angeles on the same or approximately
consecutive dates, were simultaneously deposited.
From these circumstances, which cannot be viewed as overwhelm-
ing evidence of guilty knowledge, the bank accepted criminal
responsibility for the conduct of its account officer.
The agreed penalty, beyond the forfeiture, is quite unique.
The bank, not a United States regulated institution, agreed to
submit to a special money laundering audit by U.S. auditors for
three years.'2' The audit reports must be submitted to the United
States.124 Further, the bank agreed to prepare and publish an anti-
money laundering monograph plus two annual updates."z To
secure these future agreements by the bank, the bank agreed to
open a $250,000 letter of credit at a New York bank in favor of the
United States.1"
VI. Conclusion
Evidenced by the examples cited in this article, the nature of
the business of international banking lends itself to a higher risk of
certain sophisticated forms of money laundering, and the extraordi-
nary law enforcement weapons of the United States can reach
banks in the Caribbean. This combination begs the question: how
can a small Caribbean country best protect itself and its financial
sector against a surprise, devastating blow against one of its banks?
The key to overcoming the danger of money laundering in the
Caribbean is the establishment and maintenance of good, anti-
money laundering compliance programs at each institution. This
will, at the outset, reduce the risk of the penetration of dirty money
into the financial sector. A vigorous compliance program will also
greatly assist in persuading the United States that the bank is a
good corporate citizen and should not be charged with any
violations that were consummated at the institution."




127. When an area of criminal law impacts, on a legitimate sector of the
country, such as money laundering and financial institutions, the U.S. law
enforcement community gives much lip-service to the principle that their primary
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No matter how vigorous, however, a compliance program is
not enough. Each country needs to cultivate the goodwill of the
U.S. law enforcement community at every opportunity. Success in
this endeavor requires a public relations effort of the first magni-
tude. Often, friendships can be established between respective law
enforcement personnel and bank regulators. Opportunities can be
found for mutual assistance. Such efforts will serve to educate U.S.
law enforcement personnel and, thus, can help focus law enforce-
ment goals on significant violations of mutual concern.
Positive interaction and mutual assistance will not only help
the country's financial sector in times of trouble, but it will also
increase the efficiency of interaction. Positive interactions will also
be of genuine service to the many dedicated law enforcement
personnel in both countries. The Caribbean country will be doubly
served through both promotion of the country and a reduction of
narcotics trafficking.
International banking in the Caribbean has unique problems
in the money laundering area. By the nature of its business, there
is a greater likelihood of certain sophisticated forms of money
laundering than in other areas. Consequently, it is imperative that
Caribbean countries tailor efforts of detection and prevention to fit
the specific money laundering danger present in international
banking. The costs of a compliance program may be substantial,
but the potential costs for no program are much greater
goal with regard to the legitimate sector is compliance, not prosecution. As a
result, serious and responsible efforts by an institution to comply with the money
laundering laws are considered by U.S. prosecutors when making the prosecution
decision.
